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MEASURING THE THREAT: A PROPOSAL FOR A
NEW DETAINEE VITIATION STANDARD
BENJAMIN B. GLERUM*
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have come to accept the detention of foreign terrorist suspects as a necessary byproduct of the Nation’s ongoing Overseas Contingency Operations (“OCO”). What most Americans do not think about, however, are the criteria necessary to determine both whom to detain and
for how long. In Boumediene v. Bush,1 the U.S. Supreme Court afforded the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia (“D.C. District Court”) the complete authority to answer these fundamental questions.2 In doing so, the Court itself missed an opportunity to outline procedural rules for
detention trials, and instead, permitted the D.C. District Court to establish these critically important
guidelines.3 However, despite this opportunity to set the procedural contours for detention cases,
the D.C. District Court, and later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C. Circuit Court”), have issued sometimes inconsistent rulings that paint a confusing picture of how these
cases should proceed.4
One critical question of U.S. detention policy has been met with diverse judicial interpretations
at the D.C. District Court: once the government establishes that a detainee’s relationship with a terrorist organization existed, can that relationship ever be vitiated5? In other words, if someone satis* Executive Editor, American University National Security Law Brief; J.D. Candidate, American University, Washington College of
Law, May 2012; B.A. History, 2006, Trinity College (CT).
1 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
2 Id. at 796 (“We make no attempt to anticipate all of the . . . issues that will arise during the course of the detainees’
habeas corpus proceedings.”); id. at 798 (“The cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions that it
remand the cases to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).
3 See generally id. at 796 (“These and the other remaining questions are within the expertise and competence of the
'LVWULFW&RXUWWRDGGUHVVLQWKHÀUVWLQVWDQFHµ Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law
of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 481 (2010) (suggesting that Boumediene failed to empower executive action to imprison a
person because it did not establish concrete procedures as a guide for future review).
4 See Colin C. Pogge, A Dissentious “Debate”: Shaping Habeas Procedures Post-Boumediene, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1097
(2010) (describing how the current state of Guantanamo jurisprudence in the D.C. District Court “breeds uncertainty
DQGVNHSWLFLVPµDQG´SHUVRQLÀHVDFRXUWLQGLVDJUHHPHQWDERXWWKHZD\LQZKLFKVXVSHFWHGWHUURULVWVDUHWUHDWHGLQRXU
legal system, a disagreement in need of a resolution”).
5 ´9LWLDWHµLVGHÀQHGDV´WRPDNHYRLGRUYRLGDEOHµBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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ÀHVWKHFULWHULDIRUGHWHQWLRQDVDQHQHP\FRPEDWDQWGRHVWKDWGHWHUPLQDWLRQVHUYHDVDQLQGHOLEOH
scarlet letter? Or can that relationship be vitiated by changed circumstances or time? This Article
ZLOODUJXHWKDWIROORZLQJWKHVWDWXWRU\IRXQGDWLRQRI WKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFWDQGDFFHSWHGWHQHWVRI WKH
laws of war, such a determination does not serve as a scarlet letter justifying continued detention.
Instead, the United States must take into account the current threat of the individual to justify further detention. Part II of this Article will summarize the current scope of U.S. detention power as
interpreted by the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit Courts, and will synthesize recent caselaw to determine the current standard for vitiation. Next, Part III will argue that the current vitiation standard
is inconsistent with governing law, and will recommend a standard that considers the current threat
the detainee poses to the United States. Finally, Part III will also recommend that Congress establish
this standard.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Current Standard
1. Controlling Supreme Court Opinions
The Supreme Court has issued three opinions exploring how OCO detainees can challenge their
detention.6 These decisions established much of the general procedures followed today in detention
proceedings, but they have also left many critical questions unanswered.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld7 and Rasul v. Bush,8ERWKGHFLGHGLQZHUHWKHÀUVWFDVHVUHODWHGWRKRZGHtainees can challenge their detention. In Hamdi, the Court commented that both Congress and the
&RXUWUHOLHGRQKLVWRULFDO´ODZRIZDUSULQFLSOHVµZKHQDQDO\]LQJVLWXDWLRQVLQZKLFKLQGHÀQLWHGHtention has been authorized.9 The Court held that when the United States detains citizens as enemy
FRPEDWDQWVWKHJRYHUQPHQWPXVWLQIRUPWKHFLWL]HQGHWDLQHHRI ´WKHIDFWXDOEDVLVIRUKLVFODVVLÀFDtion” and permit the citizen detainee to challenge the government’s case before an impartial court.10
In RasulWKH&RXUWKHOGWKDWGHWDLQHHVFRQÀQHGDWWKH1DYDO6WDWLRQ*XDQWDQDPR%D\KDYHWKHULJKW
to petition the D.C. District Court to contest their detention under the habeas corpus statute.11
In Boumediene, the Court held that Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right to habeas
6 See, e.g.,+DPGLY5XPVIHOG86   DQQRXQFLQJ´WKDWLQGHÀQLWHGHWHQWLRQIRUWKHSXUSRVHRI 
interrogation is not authorized”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004) (framing the issue as “whether the habeas
statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the
United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction . . .”); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (ruling that to deny the writ of
habeas corpus, Congress must utilize the Suspension Clause).
7 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
8 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
9 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
10 Id. at 533.
11 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (interpreting the law as providing the Court jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus review)
(referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in
custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof . . .
.”)).
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relief, one that Congress cannot eliminate unless habeas is suspended or adequate alternative procedures are established.12 The Court found that no such adequate alternative procedure existed,13 and
held that the D.C. District Court would hear all Guantanamo habeas detention petitions.14 In doing
so, the Court left the procedural and substantive standards open for lower courts to determine via
the common law process.15 With this holding, the Court sought to balance the competing principles
of proper deference to the Executive on matters of national security16 and the need for the Judiciary
to settle “challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a person.”17 However, the Court
UHIUDLQHGIURPDIÀUPDWLYHO\VHWWLQJDQ\VWDQGDUGVE\ZKLFKWKH'&'LVWULFW&RXUWZRXOGGHFLGHKDbeas petitions, emphasizing that the “opinion [did] not address the content of the law that governs
petitioners’ detention . . . [as the law was] yet to be determined.”18 Thus, when given a prime opportunity to set the standards governing the limits of the Executive’s detention authority, the Court
declined, and left open critical questions of U.S. detention policy.19
B. Current Scope of Detention Authority
%HIRUHDGGUHVVLQJWKHVSHFLÀFLVVXHRI YLWLDWLRQLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRÀUVWHVWDEOLVKWKHFXUUHQW
scope of U.S. detention authority, both as expressed by the Obama administration and as interpreted
by the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit Courts.
1. Obama Administration Position and Statutory Foundation
Soon after President Obama was elected, his administration indicated that it would seek to
clarify the scope of U.S. detention power and direct Congress to establish standards for detention
prosecutions.20 The administration has, however, supported the Boumediene framework of allowing
12 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
13 Id.DW ÀQGLQJWKHDTA review process to be a facially inadequate replacement for habeas corpus).
14 Id.DW ´,ILQDIXWXUHFDVHDGHWDLQHHÀOHVDKDEHDVSHWLWLRQLQDQRWKHUMXGLFLDOGLVWULFWLQZKLFKDSURSHU
respondent can be served . . . the [g]overnment can move for change of venue to the . . . United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.”).
15 See Azmy, supra note 3, at 514 (commenting that the Court has left it up to the lower courts to resolve “factual
disputes or mixed questions”).
16 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796–97 (attempting to reconcile the competing purposes of the Judiciary to uphold the
Executive’s judgments on national security and to protect one’s personal liberty to be free from restraints).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 798; see Azmy, supra note 3, at 514 (commenting that the Court has left it up to the lower courts to resolve
“factual disputes or mixed questions”).
19 See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Remarkably, despite the years that have passed since
WKHVHKDEHDVFRUSXVSHWLWLRQVZHUHÀOHGWKHVWDWHRI WKHODZUHJDUGLQJWKHVFRSHRI WKH3UHVLGHQW·VDXWKRULW\WRGHWDLQ
the petitioners remains unsettled.”); Benjamin Wittes et al., The Emerging Law of Detention: The Guantanamo Habeas Cases as
Lawmaking, THE BROOKINGS INST., Jan. 22, 2010 (noting that in Boumediene, the Court “declined to address a number of
FULWLFDOTXHVWLRQVWKDWGHÀQHWKHFRQWRXUVRI DQ\QRQFULPLQDOGHWHQWLRQV\VWHPµ 
20 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security at the National Archives (May 21, 2009)
(“We must have clear, defensible and lawful standards for those [who we cannot prosecute even though they are a danger
to the United States].”).
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the D.C. District Court to develop habeas litigation standards via the common law process.21 The
administration’s position “means that for good or ill, these rules will be written by judges through
the common-law process of litigating the habeas corpus cases of the . . . detainees still held at
Guantanamo.”22 In addition, the administration claims that it has the authority to detain not only
members of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, but also those who “substantially support” those
groups.23 The administration cites the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)24 as its
VWDWXWRU\MXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKLVDXWKRULW\25
The Obama administration’s assertion of detention authority represents a more modest approach than that of the Bush administration in two ways. First, the Bush administration asserted authority to detain not only members of al Qaeda, but also its “associated forces.”26 This rather wide
scope of asserted authority is evident in former President Bush’s statement before a joint session of
Congress on September 20, 2001, in which he said “[o]ur enemy is a radical network of terrorists,
and every government that supports them. Our war begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.
It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”27
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Bush administration based its authority to detain alleged
terrorists not only on the AUMF, like the Obama administration, but also on the inherent authority imbued in the Executive by Article II of the U.S. Constitution.28 The Obama administration has

21 Peter Baker, Obama to Use Current Law to Support Detentions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009.
22 Wittes, supra note 19, at 4.
23 See Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The President also has the authority to detain
persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or Al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners . . . .”).
24 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF].
25 See John R. Crook, State Department Legal Advisor Explains U.S. Approach to International Law, 104 AM. J. INT’L. L. 271,
275 (2010) (quoting State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh as stating that the administration’s detention authority
relies on “legislative authority expressly granted to the President in the 2001 AUMF”); Baker, supra note 21 (“Instead, the
administration will continue to hold the detainees without bringing them to trial based on the power it says it has under
the Congressional resolution passed after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, authorizing the [P]resident to use force against
forces of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.”).
26 See Wittes, supra note 19, at 16 (“The Bush administration asserted . . . [that it had] the power to detain for the
duration of hostilities both members and supported of entities—including Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ‘associated
forces.’”).
27 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001); see
David Mortlock, 'HÀQLWH'HWHQWLRQ7KH6FRSHRI WKH3UHVLGHQW·V$XWKRULW\WR'HWDLQ(QHP\&RPEDWDQWV, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
375, 387 (2010) (quoting Bush administration counsel as asserting authority to detain a “little old lady in Switzerland
ZKRZULWHVFKHFNVWRZKDWVKHWKLQNVLVDFKDULW\WKDWKHOSVRUSKDQVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQEXW>ZKDW@UHDOO\LVDIURQWWRÀQDQFH
al-Qaeda activities, a person who teaches English to the son of an al Qaeda member, and a journalist who knows the
location of Osama bin laden but refuses to disclose it to protect her source”).
28 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 378 (noting that “[t]he Bush administration repeatedly argued that its authority to
detain arose not only from the AUMF, but also from the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief under Article II
of the Constitution”).

Vol. 2, No. 1

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

93

explicitly chosen not to base its claim for detention authority on such Article II powers.29
Given that the AUMF is the only statutory authority cited by the Obama administration, analysis
of the statute is critical to a discussion of the government’s detention power. The AUMF is concise
and direct. The preamble provides the legal foundation of the statute, namely that the President has
the constitutional authority to deter and prevent future acts of international terrorism against the
United States.30 The statute then provides:
[T]he [P]resident is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.31
When he signed the resolution into law on September 18, 2001, President Bush underscored the
preventative nature of the authorization.32
Analysis of the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”) is also instructive in this context, as it
SURYLGHVGHÀQLWLRQVRI WHUPVXVHGLQFDVHVGLVFXVVHGWKURXJKRXWWKLV$UWLFOH33 The purpose of the
MCA (both the original 2006 Act and its amendments in 2009), in general, is to “authorize trial by
military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other purposes.”34 However, given
that military commissions and the post-Boumediene common law process deal with similar legal questions and concepts, it is helpful to analyze whom Congress believed the administration could try in
military commissions, outside of the normal civilian courts. Courts today still cite to the 2006 MCA
when discussing the scope of U.S. detention authority.35
7KH0&$DQGWKHDPHQGPHQWVGHÀQHWKRVHZKRIDOOXQGHUWKHVFRSHRI WKHDG-

29 See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Under the Bush administration, the government
had repeatedly asserted that it could detain individuals pursuant to the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief
under Article II, § 2, clause 1 of the Constitution . . . .”).
30 AUMF at pmble.
31 Id.
 3UHVV5HOHDVH:KLWH+RXVH2IÀFHRI WKH3UHVV6HFUHWDU\3UHVLGHQW6LJQV$XWKRUL]DWLRQIRU8VHRI 0LOLWDU\)RUFH
Bill (Sept. 18, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2001/09/print/20010918-10.html.
33 See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) [hereinafter “2006
MCA”]; Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009) [hereinafter “2009
MCA”].
34 2006 MCA pmbl.
35 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing 2006 MCA sec. 3, § 948a(1)) (“Congress, in
WKH0&$SURYLGHGJXLGDQFHRQWKHFODVVRI SHUVRQVVXEMHFWWRGHWHQWLRQXQGHUWKH$80)E\GHÀQLQJXQODZIXO
enemy combatants who can be tried by a military commission.”).
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ministration’s military commission structure in similar ways.367KH0&$GHÀQHGDQXQODZIXO
HQHP\FRPEDWDQW WKHQWKHJHQHUDOGHÀQLWLRQRI DWHUURULVWZKRWKHJRYHUQPHQWZDVDXWKRUL]HGWR
detain) as “a person who has . . . purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United
States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant . . . .”37 While the 2009 MCA
amendments abandoned the term “unlawful enemy combatant” altogether, and instead described the
type of person under MCA jurisdiction as an “unprivileged enemy belligerent,”38WKHGHÀQLWLRQRI 
unprivileged enemy belligerent used language nearly identical to that of “unlawful enemy combatDQWµ7KHDPHQGPHQWV·GHÀQLWLRQFRYHUHGLQGLYLGXDOVZKRKDYH´HQJDJHGLQKRVWLOLWLHVDJDLQVW
the United States or its coalition partners,” who either “purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners” or “[were] part of al Qaeda at the time of
the alleged offense under this chapter.”39
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Obama Position
The Obama administration explicitly envisioned that the Judiciary would determine, on a caseby-case basis, what constitutes the level and type of “substantial support” required for detention.40
The courts initially accepted the administration’s assertion of detention authority. In Gherebi v.
Obama,41 D.C. District Court Judge Walton agreed with the administration’s claim that the AUMF
SURYLGHGDVXIÀFLHQWMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUGHWHQWLRQ42 and adopted “the basic framework advanced by the
government for determining whether an individual is subject to that authority.”43 However, Judge
:DOWRQTXDOLÀHG44 the substantial support standard, interpreting it to include only individuals who

36 Compare0&$D  L  GHÀQLQJDQ´XQODZIXOHQHP\FRPEDWDQWµDV´DSHUVRQZKRKDVSXUSRVHIXOO\
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant
(including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)”), with 2009 MCA § 948a(7)(a)–(c)
(conferring jurisdiction over those who have “engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners . . .
[have] purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” or “[were] part
of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense under this chapter”).
37 2006 MCA § 948a(1)(i).
38 2009 MCA § 948a(7).
39 Id. § 948a(7)(a)–(c).
40 See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Memo for the Government at 1–2, Gherebi
v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009)) (“However, the government believes that ‘[i]t is neither possible nor
advisable . . . to attempt to identify[] in the abstract[] the precise nature and degree of ‘substantial support,’ or the precise
characteristics of ‘associated forces.’. . . . Instead, it opines that ‘the contours of the ‘substantial support’ and ‘associated
forces’ bases of detention will need to be further developed in their application to concrete facts in individual cases.’”).
41 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009).
42 See id. at 54 (“For the reasons explained at length below, the Court agrees with the government that the AUMF
functions as an independent basis in domestic law for the President’s asserted detention authority . . . .”).
43 Id.
44 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 390–91 (stating that the court “did not reject outright the government’s ‘substantial
VXSSRUW·VWDQGDUGµEXWVLPSO\´OLPLW>HG@LWVDSSOLFDWLRQWRGHWDLQHHVZKRÀWKLVFULWHULDIRUPHPEHUVKLSLQWKHKLHUDUFK\
of enemy organizations”).
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were “effectively” part of enemy terrorist armed forces.45 In this regard, Judge Walton’s interpretation is similar to certain elements of the 2009 MCA: those subject to the administration’s detention
power must have “engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners” and have
been “part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense under this chapter.”46 Judge Walton’s
framework has since been applied by D.C. District Court judges in Mohammed v. Obama47 and AlAdahi v. Obama.48
In Hamlily v. Obama,49 D.C. District Court Judge Bates adopted a narrower approach. Judge Bates
outright rejected the “substantial support” standard,50 and instead held that the key inquiry in any
habeas challenge was whether the individual was part of al Qaeda in that he or she “function[ed] or
participate[d] within or under the command structure of the organization.”51 In determining whethHUVRPHRQHVDWLVÀHVWKLVWHVWVRPHOHYHORI ´NQRZOHGJHRULQWHQWLVUHTXLUHGµ52 This requirement
emphasizes the “functionality” of Judge Bates’ test. An individual is not detainable by the United
States if he or she is unwittingly part of a terrorist group; the individual actually has to functionally
serve that group in some capacity. In elucidating this test, Judge Bates directly hearkened back to the
Bush administration’s claim of authority to detain “associated forces,”53 and agreed that detention of
VXFK´DVVRFLDWHGIRUFHVµZDVMXVWLÀHGDFFRUGLQJWRKLVPRGHO54 Therefore, although Judge Bates declined to set an actual bright line standard,55 he offered a framework stipulating that detainees need
be a co-belligerent to have been part of a terrorist group56 to justify detention. The D.C. District

45 See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (“In other words, the Court interprets the government’s ‘substantial support’
standard to mean individuals who were members of the ‘armed forces’ of an enemy organization at the time of their
initial detention.”).
46 2009 MCA §948a(7)(a)–(c).
47 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that “Judge Walton’s opinion presented a clearer approach, and
therefore [adopting] his reasoning and conclusion”).
48 No. 05-280, 2009 WL 2584685, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (noting that “[w]hile the Court has great regard for
the scholarship and analysis contained in both decisions, the Court concludes that Judge Walton’s opinion presented a
clearer approach, and therefore will adopt his reasoning and conclusion”).
49 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
50 See id. at 69 (holding that “detention based on substantial or direct support for the Taliban, al Qaeda or associated
forces, without more, is simply not warranted by domestic law or the law of war”).
51 Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
52 Id.
53 See Wittes, supra note 19, at 16 (“The Bush administration asserted . . . [that it had] the power to detain for the
duration of hostilities both members and supporters of entities—including [a]l Qaeda, the Taliban, and ‘associated
forces’ . . . .”).
54 Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (stating that “[t]he authority also reaches those who were members of ‘associated
forces’ which the Court interprets to mean ‘co-belligerents’ . . .”).
55 Id. at 75 (“With respect to the criteria to be used in determining whether someone was ‘part of ’ the ‘Taliban or al
Qaida or associated forces,’ the Court will not attempt to set forth an exhaustive list because such determinations must
be made on an individualized basis.”).
56 See id. (“Accordingly the government has the authority to detain members of ‘associated forces’ as long as those
forces would be considered co-belligerents . . . .”). The court also emphasized that “some level of knowledge or intent”
WREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHWHUURULVWJURXSZDVUHTXLUHGIRUMXVWLÀHGGHWHQWLRQId.
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Court has since applied the Hamlily approach in a number of cases.57
Comparing the Hamlily and Gherebi tests is instructive, as the difference between the two, while
DSSHDULQJWREHJUHDWDWÀUVWLVHVVHQWLDOO\RQHRI VHPDQWLFV:KLOH-XGJH:DOWRQDFFHSWHGWKH
“substantial support” standard by qualifying it to mean something that the administration may or
may not agree with,58 Judge Bates rejected the test while describing a standard that is not dissimilar
to that used by Judge Walton.59 Judge Bates even cited Judge Walton’s Gherebi opinion in describing
ZKDWVDWLVÀHGWKH´IXQFWLRQDOLW\µUHTXLUHPHQWRI KLVWHVW60 So, while Judge Bates rejected the substantial support standard in a literal sense,61DQGGHVFULEHGWKLVDVWKHGHÀQLQJGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQKH
and Judge Walton,62HYHQ-XGJH%DWHVDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDW´DVDSSOLHGLQVSHFLÀFFDVHVWKLVGLIIHUHQFH
should not be great.”63
The current law controlling the scope of the administration’s detention power, however, is found
in a recent D.C. Circuit Court opinion, Al-Bihani v. Obama.64 Writing for the D.C. Circuit Court,
Judge Brown departed from Hamlily and its progeny, and accepted that substantially supporting a
terrorist group canEHVXIÀFLHQWJURXQGVIRUGHWHQWLRQVRORQJDVWKHGHWDLQHHLV´SDUWRI µDO4Deda in that he “purposefully and materially support[ed] . . . hostilities against the U.S. [or c]oalition
57 See, e.g., Abdah v. Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that, “accordingly, as Judge Bates ruled in
Hamlily . . . the U.S. may detain “those who are ‘part of the ‘Taliban or al Qaida forces’ . . .”); Anam v. Obama, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2010).(applying Hamlily standard); Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting
that the court has “adopted Judge Bates’ approach [in Hamlily]”), aff ’d 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Muitari v. United
States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the “the Court shall adopt the reasoning set forth in Judge
John D. Bates’s decision in Hamlily . . .”).
58 See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70 (D.D.C. 2009) (interpreting the “substantial support” standard
“to mean individuals who were members of the ‘armed forces’ of an enemy organization at the time of their initial
detention”).
59 See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (“Accordingly the government has the authority to detain members of ‘associated
forces’ as long as those forces would be considered co-belligerents . . . .”).
60 See id. (citing Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69) (noting, after describing the test, that “as Gherebi observed, [the
IXQFWLRQDOLW\WHVWFRXOGEHVDWLVÀHGE\@DQLQGLYLGXDO¶WDVNHGZLWKKRXVLQJIHHGLQJRUWUDQVSRUWLQJDO4DHGDÀJKWHUV
EXWDQDO4DHGDGRFWRURUFOHULFRUWKHIDWKHURI DQDO4DHGDÀJKWHUZKRVKHOWHUVKLVVRQRXWRI IDPLOLDOOR\DOW\>LVQRW
likely detainable] assuming such individuals had no independent role in al-Qaeda’s chain of command’. . .”).
61 See id. at 76 (“Hence, the government’s reliance on ‘substantial support’ as a basis for detention independent of
membership in the Taliban, al Qaeda or an associated force is rejected.”).
62 Id. (“This represents a difference between this Court’s approach and that of Judge Walton in Gherebi.”).
63 Id.; see Mortlock, supra note 27, at 391 (noting that “[d]espite the apparently different treatment of ‘substantial
support,’ the decisions in Gherebi and Hamlily are functionally the same . . . [t]hey agree that only members of an enemy
force may be detained, and that the level of support from one particular individual can be used to determine whether
that individual falls into the hierarchical structure of an organization”).
64 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Petitioners moved for the D.C. Circuit Court
to review the case to clarify whether certain statements relating to the controlling nature of international law were
binding or dicta. See Charlie Savage, Appeals Court Backs Away From War Powers Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, August 31, 2010, at
A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/us/politics/01legal.html. The panel’s denial did not completely
resolve the issue; while seven of the nine panel judges concurred in a joint statement expressing their belief that the
statements in question were dicta, two judges separately concurred to claim that the statements were not dicta but in fact
controlling law. See id.
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partners.”65 Like Hamlily (and to a certain extent, Gherebi -XGJH%URZQTXDOLÀHGWKH2EDPDDGPLQistration’s substantial support standard, drawing heavily upon the 2006 MCA and its 2009 amendments.66-XGJH%URZQMXVWLÀHGKHUDSSOLFDWLRQRI WKH0&$WRWKHUHDOPRI PLOLWDU\GHWHQWLRQVLQ
that “the government’s detention authority logically covers a category of persons no narrower than
is covered by its military commission authority.”67 The result is a standard that has been described
by its critics as entirely too broad,68 but despite its arguably limitless scope, Al-Bihani’s interpretation of the substantial support standard is now binding law in all habeas petitions heard by the D.C.
District and D.C. Circuit Courts.69
C. Vitiation—Once a Terrorist, Always a Terrorist?
Once the D.C. District Court holds that the Al-Bihani criteria are met and the detention is justiÀHGIRUDSDUWLFXODUWHUURULVWVXVSHFWFDQWKDWVWDWXVHYHUEHYLWLDWHG"3XWDQRWKHUZD\´LVHOLJLELOLW\
for detention indelible in the sense that having once been a member or supporter of these groups,
one can always be detained?”70,I WKHDQVZHULV´\HVµDQGFDWHJRULFDOLQGHÀQLWHGHWHQWLRQLVFRPpelled by satisfaction of the Al-BihaniFULWHULDZKDWLVWKHOHJDOMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKDWSRVLWLRQ",I QRW
DQGYLWLDWLRQLVSRVVLEOHZKDWVKRXOGWKHWHVWEHDQGZKDWLVWKHMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKDWWHVW"
The issue of vitiation has arisen in many detention cases, and D.C. District Court judges have
taken “notably different positions on it.”71 After analyzing each of these positions, and comparing
them to the controlling law as held by the D.C. Circuit Court, this Article will then propose a different standard.
1. Initial Interpretations by the D.C. District Court
In Basardh v. Obama,72 D.C. District Court Judge Huvelle held that vitiation is possible, and
depended on the “current likelihood of [the detainee] rejoining the enemy.”73 Judge Huvelle did

65 Al-Bihani)GDW ´$O%LKDQLLVODZIXOO\GHWDLQHGZKHWKHUWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI DGHWDLQDEOHSHUVRQLVDVWKH
GLVWULFWFRXUWDUWLFXODWHGLW¶DQLQGLYLGXDOZKRZDVSDUWRI RUVXSSRUWLQJ7DOLEDQRUDO4DHGDIRUFHV·RUWKHPRGLÀHG
version offered by the government that requires that an individual ‘substantially support’ enemy forces.”).
66 See id. (“But for this case, it is enough to recognize that any person subject to a military commission trial [per the
2006 MCA and 2009 amendments] is also subject to detention, and that category of persons includes those who are
part of forces associated with [a]l Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and materially support such forces in
hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.”).
67 Id.
68 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 392 (noting that while the “Court’s ruling was consistent with the [Gherebi and
Hamlily models, the Al-Bihani Court] issued dicta that went well beyond the principles of this membership model”).
69 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (claiming that the Al-Bihani standard governs who can
be detained by the government under the AUMF).
70 Wittes, supra note 19, at 23.
71 Id.
72 612 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2009).
73 Id. at 35.
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not take into account what had occurred prior to Basardh’s detention,74 but rather focused solely on
what events, if any, occurred after his detention that could have some impact on the continued legality of that detention.75 The government had encouraged Basardh to cooperate,76 and he complied,77
to the extent that his fellow detainees repeatedly threatened to kill him.78 Basardh also said he felt
unsafe returning to his homeland and wanted instead to gain asylum in the United States, and even
join the U.S. military.79 Judge Huvelle held that the AUMF, on which the Obama administration exclusively relies for detention authority, does not authorize detention “beyond that which is necessary
to prevent [detainees] from rejoining the battle,”80 and argued that Hamdi supported that interpretation.81 Judge Huvelle stated that “Basardh’s current likelihood of rejoining the enemy is relevant to
ZKHWKHUKLVFRQWLQXHGGHWHQWLRQLVMXVWLÀHGXQGHUWKHODZµ82 and that in this context, the court must
consider “evidence relating to whether the detainee is no longer a threat.”83 Judge Huvelle found
that evidence illustrated that Basardh was no longer a threat to the United States, and therefore, the
$80)QRORQJHUMXVWLÀHG%DVDUGK·VGHWHQWLRQ84
In Awad v. Obama85 and Anam v. Obama,86 D.C. District Court Judges Robertson and Hogan
adopted a stricter approach, holding that vitiation is not possible if the detainee everVDWLVÀHGWKHFUL-

74 Id. at 31 (noting that “petitioner’s activities prior to his detention at Guantanamo . . . are not at issue here”).
75 See id. (“Rather, the only issue before the Court is a narrow one—what, if any, relevance does Basardh’s [behavior
after detention] have to a determination of the lawlessness of his continued detention?”).
76 Id. at 32 (“In addition, throughout this period [redacted] the government has encouraged [Basardh’s cooperation].
. . . [and] advised the detainee that in making its determination whether [he] could be released or transferred, the
[government would] ‘consider . . . if [he was] working with the United States government trying to help.”).
77 See id. (“Basardh ‘cooperated his entire stay while [at Guantanamo].’”); Del Quentin Wilber, Detainee-Informer Presents
Quandary for Government, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/02/02/AR2009020203337.html (“In dozens of interviews over several years at [Guantanamo Bay] . . .
Yasim Muhammad Basardh provided the evidence needed to continue detaining scores of alleged terrorists, military
and FBI records show. . . . [I]t didn’t take long for Basardh to begin identifying others who trained at [the] al-Farooq [alQaeda training camp], stayed at Taliban or al-Qaeda guest houses, protected bin Laden, or fought at Tora Bora.”).
78 See 612 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (noting that the detainee “‘was beaten by other Detainees who believe he is a spy’ and
‘was threatened many times to be killed by other Detainees’”); see also Wilber, supra note 77 (“Basardh is a well-known
informer among the other detainees at the prison.”).
79 Wilber, supra note 77 (“He wants asylum in the United States and a chance to join the U.S military.”).
80 Basardh, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 35.
83 Id.
84 See id. (“[T]he court concludes that the government has failed to meet its burden of establishing that Basardh’s
continued detention is authorized under the AUMF’s directive that such force be used ‘in order to prevent future acts of
international terrorism’ . . . [t]he undisputed facts establish that Basardh’s [redacted] is known to the world, and thus, any
ties with the enemy have been severed, and any realistic risk that he could rejoin the enemy has been foreclosed . . . his
continued detention lacks a basis in fact as well as in law.”).
85 646 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2009).
86 696 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
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WHULDIRUGHWHQWLRQDQGDVWDWXWRULO\DXWKRUL]HGFRQÁLFWLVVWLOOXQGHUZD\87 In Awad, Judge Robertson
found that Awad was more likely than not part of al Qaeda for some period of time, but declined
to even consider whether his continued detention was in any way related to his current threat to the
United States.88 Despite the fact that Judge Robertson acknowledged that it was “ludicrous” to think
Awad still posed a security threat to the United States, he declined to address that consideration,
basing his position on Hamdi’s holding that the President’s detention authority existed until the end
RI WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFW89 Judge Hogan similarly refused the possibility of vitiation in Anam,90 even
DIWHUÀQGLQJWKDW$QDPGLGQRWSRVHDWKUHDWWRWKHVHFXULW\RI WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV91 Again, Judge
Hogan relied on Hamdi in holding that the President had the authority to detain for the duration of
WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFW92DQGJLYHQWKDWWKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFWZDVVWLOORQJRLQJ´WKHFRXUW·VKDQGV>ZHUH@
tied.”93
While Anam, Awad, and Basardh all explore whether vitiation is possible based on events after
capture, Al Ginco v. Obama94 explores the separate question of whether detention can be vitiated if
the terrorist relationship does not exist up until the moment of capture.95 In Al Ginco, the detainee
had visited an al Qaeda camp, but then fell out of favor with al Qaeda and was subsequently tortured and imprisoned.96 U.S. forces then took Al Ginco into custody.97-XGJH/HRQÀUVWKHOGWKDW
vitiation, in some capacity, is absolutely available to detainees.98 He offered a factor-based test to
GHWHUPLQHLI YLWLDWLRQLVMXVWLÀDEOHLQDJLYHQFDVHRULQRWKHUZRUGV´ZKHWKHUDSUHH[LVWLQJ>WHUURU87 See id. at 4 (concluding that because the detainee had met the standards for detention, the “Court’s hands are tied”);
Awad)6XSSGDW QRWLQJWKDWWKHGHWDLQHHFDQEHKHOGIRUWKHGXUDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWDFFRUGLQJWRHamdi and the
AUMF).
88 646 F. Supp. 2d at 24, 27 (declining to consider “whether or to what extent the continued detention of Awad
supports the AUMF’s self-stated purpose of ‘prevent[ing] . . . future acts of international terrorism’. . .”).
89 Id.
90 See Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 4 (“Absent from the above framework is mention of the threat the individual poses to
the national security of the United States. Though recognizing its normative appeal, the Court declines to adopt in this
case Judge Ellen S. Huvelle’s conclusion in [Basardh] . . . .”).
91 Id. (describing, at length, how Anam does not pose a threat to the United States).
92 See id. at 4 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)) (noting that “[u]nder the AUMF, the President
SRVVHVVHV´WKHDXWKRULW\WRGHWDLQIRUWKHGXUDWLRQRI WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFWEDVHGRQORQJVWDQGLQJODZRIZDU
principles”).
93 Id.
94 626 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009).
95 See id. at 130 (noting that “the conclusion is inescapable that [Al Ginco’s] pre-existing relationship, such as it was,
ZDVVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGWKDWKHZDVQRORQJHU¶SDUWRI ·DO4DHGD RUWKH7DOLEDQ DWWKHWLPHKHZDVWDNHQLQWRFXVWRG\
.”).
96 Id. at 127.
97 Id.
98 See id.DW ´%\WDNLQJDSRVLWLRQWKDWGHÀHVFRPPRQVHQVHWKHJRYHUQPHQWIRUFHVWKLVFRXUWWRDGGUHVVDQ
issue novel to these habeas proceedings: whether a prior relationship between a detainee and al Qaeda (or the Taliban)
FDQEHVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGE\WKHSDVVDJHRI WLPHLQWHUYHQLQJHYHQWVRUERWKVXFKWKDWWKHGHWDLQHHFRXOGQRORQJHU
be considered to be ‘part of ’ either organization at the time he was taken into custody. The answer, of course, is yes.”)
(emphasis added).
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ist] relationship has eroded over time.”99 Judge Leon implied that, to be a valid detention, the illicit
terrorist relationship must have continued up until the moment of capture.100 He held that because
of the “extraordinary intervening events”101 present in Al Ginco’s case, the AUMF did not support
Al Ginco’s detention at the time of his capture. The D.C. District Court has since applied this approach.102
2. D.C. Circuit Interpretation
a. The Current Standard
The D.C. Circuit Court has indicated, in Al-Bihani and Awad, 103 its preference for the harder-line
approach outlined by D.C. District Court Judges Robertson and Hogan in Awad and Anam.
Synthesis of the D.C. Circuit Court opinions in Al-Bihani and Awad illustrates the current standard, which basically provides that if the Al-Bihani test for detention is met, and authorized hostilities are ongoing, vitiation is impossible.104 The standard therefore parallels the hard line, narrow approaches espoused by Judges Robertson and Hogan, and gives little credence at all to the arguments
presented by Judges Huvelle and Leon.105 In Al-Bihani, Judge Brown, writing for the court, accepted
that the government initially had authority to detain Al-Bihani, and held that absent a determination
E\WKHSROLWLFDOEUDQFKHVWKDWKRVWLOLWLHVKDGFHDVHG$O%LKDQL·VFRQWLQXHGGHWHQWLRQZDVMXVWLÀHG
99 Id.DW ´>7@RGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUDSUHH[LVWLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVXIÀFLHQWO\HURGHGRYHUDVXVWDLQHGSHULRGRI WLPH
WKH&RXUWPXVWDWDPLQLPXPORRNWRWKHIROORZLQJIDFWRUV  WKHQDWXUHRI WKHUHODWLRQVKLSLQWKHÀUVWLQVWDQFH  
the nature of intervening events or conduct; and (3) the amount of time that has passed between the time of the presexisting relationship and the point in time at which the detainee is taken into custody.”).
100 See id. at 130 (“[T]he conclusion is inescapable that [Al Ginco’s] pre-existing relationship, such as it was, was
VXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGWKDWKHZDVQRORQJHU¶SDUWRI ·DO4DHGD RUWKH7DOLEDQ DWWKHWLPHKHZDVWDNHQLQWRFXVWRG\    WKH
[g]overnment has [therefore] failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] was lawfully detainable . . .
under the AUMF at the time he was taken into custody.”).
101 Id. at 127.
102 See Khalifh v. Obama, No. 05-CV-1189, 2010 WL 2382925, at *2 (D.D.C. May 28, 2010) (applying Al Ginco WRÀQG
that a detainee “who may once have been part of al-Qaida or the Taliban can show that he was no longer part of such
DQHQWLW\DWWKHWLPHRI FDSWXUHE\VKRZLQJWKDWKHWRRNDIÀUPDWLYHDFWLRQVWRDEDQGRQKLVPHPEHUVKLSµ 
103 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
104 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–75 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that Al-Bihani’s connections “render
him detainable” pursuant to the standard for detention, and that “in the absence of a determination by the political
EUDQFKHVWKDWKRVWLOLWLHVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQKDYHHQGHG$O%LKDQL·VFRQWLQXHGGHWHQWLRQLVMXVWLÀHGµ Awad, 608 F.3d at 11
(noting that “Al-Bihani makes plain that the United States’ authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on
whether an individual would pose a threat to the United States or its allies if released but rather upon the continuation
of hostilities”).
105 Compare Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the detainee can be held for the
GXUDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWDFFRUGLQJWRHamdi and the AUMF), and Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010)
(concluding that because the detainee had met the standards for detention, the “courts hands are tied”), with Basardh v.
Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the AUMF only authorizes preventative detention and must
take into account the threat posed by the detainee), and Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (noting that a prior terrorist
UHODWLRQVKLSFDQEHVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGE\WKHSDVVDJHRI WLPHRULQWHUYHQLQJHYHQWVVRWKDWWKHGHWDLQHH´FRXOGQR
longer be considered to be ‘part of ’ [al Qaeda] at the time he was taken into custody”).
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under law.106 Similarly, in Awad-XGJH6HQWHOOH·VRSLQLRQIRUWKHFRXUWDIÀUPHG-XGJH5REHUWVRQ·V
claim that governmental authority to detain Awad was dependent on the continuation of hostilities,
not the threat posed by the detainee.107 Judge Sentelle noted that Al-Bihani had foreclosed the question of whether vitiation is possible if the detainee poses no current threat to the United States if
released, concluding that “whether a detainee would pose a threat to U.S. interests if released is not
at issue in habeas corpus proceedings in federal courts concerning aliens detained under the authority conferred by the AUMF.”108
b. Legal Support for Current Standard
D.C. Circuit Court Judges Brown and Sentelle, as well as D.C. District Court Judges Robertson and Hogan, rely on the interplay between the AUMF and the law of war, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in HamdiWRÀQGWKDWWKH3UHVLGHQWKDVWKHDXWKRULW\WRGHWDLQSRWHQWLDOWHUURULVWVIRU
WKHGXUDWLRQRI WKHDXWKRUL]HGFRQÁLFW*HQHUDOO\VSHDNLQJWKHUHDVRQLQJIROORZVDVLPLODUSDWWHUQ
the AUMF is valid, and Hamdi interpreted the AUMF to authorize detention for the duration of the
DXWKRUL]HGFRQÁLFWEDVHGRQWKHODZVRI ZDU109
As mentioned earlier, HamdiKHOGWKDWWKH$80)MXVWLÀHGWKHGHWHQWLRQRI SRVVLEOHWHUURULVWV
IRUWKHGXUDWLRQRI WKHFRQÁLFW110 This holding is widely accepted.111 At the District Court level,
Judge Hogan applied Hamdi in AnamWRKROGWKDWEHFDXVHWKHDXWKRUL]HGFRQÁLFWZDVQRWRYHU´WKH
court’s hands are tied.”112 Similarly, Judge Robertson held in AwadWKDWWKHFRQÁLFWLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ
continues, and thus, the President still has detention authority.113 At the Circuit Court level, Judges
Brown and Sentelle cited Hamdi in similar fashion in Al Bihani and Awad, emphasizing that the exisWHQFHRI WKHFRQÁLFWVLPSO\SUHFOXGHGYLWLDWLRQ114
106 590 F.3d 866, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
107 608 F.3d at 8.
108 Id. at 18–19 (emphasis added).
109 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“If the record establishes that U.S. troops are still involved in active
combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ and therefore are
authorized by the AUMF.”); see id. at 520 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135) (explaining that “[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of active hostilities”).
110 Id. at 521 (“If the record establishes that U.S. troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those
detentions are part of the exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.”).
111 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 396 (noting that “the plurality of the Supreme Court in Hamdi understood
‘Congress’ grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to detain for the
GXUDWLRQRI WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFWµ 
112 Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010).
113 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Hamdi 542 U.S. at 520).
114 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“With the government’s detention authority
established as an initial matter, we turn to the argument that Al-Bihani must now be released according to longstanding
ODZRI ZDUSULQFLSOHVEHFDXVHWKHFRQÁLFWZLWKWKH7DOLEDQKDVDOOHJHGO\HQGHGµ Awad, 608 F.3d at 3 (“[I]n pursuit of
this campaign and in other parts of the world, still acting under the AUMF, the United States has captured and detained
members of the enemy force.”).
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Judge Brown also cited the laws of war in reaching her conclusion regarding vitiation in AlBihani.115 This is no surprise, given that the Supreme Court in Hamdi expressly articulated that its
holding was based on longstanding law of war principles.116 The laws of war are seemingly succinct
on the question of vitiation, with the Third Geneva Convention stating that “prisoners shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”117 In Al-Bihani, Judge Brown
consequently held that the Geneva Conventions only require release and repatriation of prisoners
following the end of hostilities.118
III. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH
A. Philosophical Shortcomings of the Current Standard
On a philosophical level, it does not make sense to ignore the current threat posed by OCO
detainees. Professor Tung Yin has written that “continuing to detain persons who are no longer
threats to the United States is undesirable and is unlikely to persuade the rest of the world of our
good intentions.”119,QDJOREDOFRQÁLFWLQZKLFKZLQQLQJKHDUWVDQGPLQGVVHUYHVVXFKDSDUDPRXQW
concern, the current standard does not promote that end.
0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\WKHJHQHVLVRI WKHFXUUHQWVWDQGDUGGRHVQRWUHÁHFWWKHOHJDOOHHZD\HQMR\HG
by the D.C. District Court in the post-Boumediene world. When one reads Judge Hogan’s conclusion
in Anam that his “hands are tied” on the question of vitiation,120 despite the fact that the detainee in
question did not pose a current threat to the United States,121LWLVGLIÀFXOWWREHOLHYHWKDWWKHFRXUW
on which he sits had been given the opportunity to set the very standards he claims he was prohibited from modifying.122 Indeed, despite what Judge Hogan said in Anam, academics have largely

115 See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
116 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 520 (2004) (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135) (holding that “[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated without
delay after the cessation of active hostilities”).
117 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 (emphasis added).
118 590 F.3d at 874 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
119 Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: a Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing
Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 150 (2005).
120 Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010).
121 Id.
122 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008) (“We make no attempt to anticipate all of the [procedural]
issues that will arise during the course of the detainees’ habeas corpus proceedings . . . these and the other remaining
TXHVWLRQVDUHZLWKLQWKHH[SHUWLVHDQGFRPSHWHQFHRI WKH'LVWULFW&RXUWWRDGGUHVVLQWKHÀUVWLQVWDQFHµ id. at 798
(“The cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions that it remand the cases to the District Court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).
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interpreted Boumediene as affording the D.C. District Court a tremendous amount of judicial power.123
Boumediene invited the presiding judges to step outside of their normal comfort zone of judicial
restraint and to function not only as judges, but also as policy-makers.124 Furthermore, the Obama
administration had all but validated such a role for the court,125 despite considerable anticipation that
it might pursue a legislative solution.126
The vast leeway afforded to the D.C. District Court, indeed the tremendous opportunity provided to it by Boumediene and the administration’s deference on the issue, is best illustrated in Basardh.127
There, Judge Huvelle used statutory analysis to determine the breadth of U.S. detention authority,128
and then departed from her fellow District Court judges to establish a creative and fair vitiation standard to apply to Guantanamo habeas petitions.129 Basardh shows the wide judicial and interpretive
URRPWKHFRXUWKDGWRRSHUDWHDQGLOOXVWUDWHVWKHÁDZVLQKHUHQWLQ-XGJH+RJDQ·V´KDQGVDUHWLHGµ
metaphor.130
Instead of taking the opportunity to offer creative legal solutions that take into account our
national security responsibilities, while providing detainees with the ability to argue for vitiation,
123 See Azmy, supra note 3, at 537 (describing Boumediene as a “largely unlimited invitation to the lower courts to
create a whole new corpus of habeas law in the context of military detention”); Pogge, supra note 4, at 1078 (describing
Boumediene as issuing a “mandate to design procedures for the Guantanamo detention proceedings”); id. at 1080
(“Boumediene elevated the district courts to sit at the head of the table. The D.C. District did not voluntarily position
itself in the mist of habeas commotion. Rather, its authority over the disposition of these petitions was essentially
sealed by the Supreme Court’s majority in Boumediene, who advocated for consolidating the habeas petitions within
the D.C. District . . . but although the Supreme Court made clear that the D.C. District Court would be the venue of
choice, its recommendations for how to arrange the proceedings were, to say the least, wanting.”); see also Judith Resnick,
Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 632 (2010) (describing the “core premise” of
Boumediene as being that “that courts play[] a critical role by standing between individuals and the Executive”).
124 See Pogge, supra note 4, at 1096 (stating that “Boumediene’s call for the D.C. District to take the reins of all habeas
petitions constitutes a qualitatively different type of judicial intervention . . . the judges in this context are functioning
QRWMXVWLQWKHLUQRUPDOFDSDFLW\DVIDFWÀQGHUVEXWDOVRDVSROLF\PDNHUVµ 
125 See Wittes, supra note 19, at 4 (noting that the administration’s position “means that for good or ill, these rules will
be written by judges through the common-law process of litigating the habeas corpus cases of the . . . detainees still held
at Guantanamo”).
126 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security at the National Archives (May 21,
2009) (“We must have clear, defensible, and lawful standards for those who fall into this category. We must have fair
procedures so that we don’t make mistakes. We must have a thorough process of periodic review so that any prolonged
GHWHQWLRQLVFDUHIXOO\HYDOXDWHGDQGMXVWLÀHGDQGVRJRLQJIRUZDUGmy administration will work with Congress to develop an
appropriate legal regime.”) (emphasis added).
127 See Pogge, supra note 4, at 1094 (“Contrasting Leon’s steady, conservative [opinion in Al Ginco] with Huvelle’s
evolving, pro-petitioner [opinion in Basardh] demonstrates the amount of discretion available to district judges.”).
128 See Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the AUMF “requires some nexus
between the force (i.e., detention) and its purpose (i.e., preventing an enemy from rejoining the enemy to commit future
hostile acts) . . . the AUMF does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent
those individuals from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to authorize detention where its purpose can
no longer be attained”).
129 See id. at 34–35 (establishing an individualized assessment of dangerousness to determine if detention is
statutorily authorized).
130 Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010).
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the D.C. Circuit Court has instead chosen to foreclose the possibility of vitiation.131 The court has
done so despite the fact that the Obama administration is on the record as indicating that it believes
vitiation is possible.132 On a legal level, the D.C. Circuit Court’s current approach is questionable.
Indeed, the same authorities cited in support of the current standard not only undermine that standard, but arguably support a new standard altogether.
B. A New Approach
7KHSURSHUVWDQGDUGVKRXOGDOORZIRUYLWLDWLRQHYHQLI DQRQJRLQJDXWKRUL]HGPLOLWDU\FRQÁLFW
H[LVWV0RUHVSHFLÀFDOO\WKHVWDQGDUGVKRXOGIRFXVRQWKHSUHVHQWWKUHDWSRVHGWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
by the detainee,133 drawing on the reasoning of Al Ginco and Basardh: if the detainee either did not
present a threat at the time of capture, or does not constitute a current threat, the detention should
be vitiated.134
Both Al Ginco and BasardhDUHSUHGLFDWHGRQWKHQRWLRQWKDWGHWHQWLRQVKRXOGUHÁHFWWKHFXUrent threat posed by the detainee.135 In Al Ginco, that notion manifested in the idea that the detainee
still had to maintain the terrorist relationship up until the time of capture; if he did not satisfy the
criteria for detention at the time of capture, he certainly did not pose a current threat and could not
be detained.136 In Basardh, Judge Huvelle went one step further, arguing that even if the terrorist
relationship existed at the time of capture, if the detainee presently did not pose a threat, detention

131 See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that “Al-Bihani makes plain that the United States’
authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on whether an individual would pose a threat to the United
States or its allies if released but rather upon the continuation of hostilities”).
132 See$O*LQFRY2EDPD)6XSSGQ ''&  FLWLQJ&ODVVLÀHG7UDQVFULSWRI 2UDO
Argument at 39, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123) (“[W]e are not saying once a Taliban, always a Taliban”) (noting that “[h]appily,
the Government, to its credit, does not go so far as to contend that any prior relationship with al Qaeda or the Taliban,
KRZHYHUGLVWDQWLQWKHSDVWDQGUHJDUGOHVVRI LQWHUYHQLQJFLUFXPVWDQFHVLVDVXIÀFLHQWEDVLVWRKROGDQLQGLYLGXDOXQGHU
$80)LQGHÀQLWHO\µ 
133 See&XUWLV$%UDGOH\ -DFN/*ROGVPLWKCongressional Authority and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2048, 2125 (2005) (advocating for a framework that evaluates detainees “in individual rather than group-based terms);
Yin, supra note 119, at 199 (recommending that continued detention should depend “on the government’s ability to
demonstrate the detainee’s dangerousness”); Mortlock, supra note 27, at 375–76 (proposing a “membership model” to
determine, on an individual basis, who falls under the government’s authority to detain).
134 See Al Ginco)6XSSGDW KROGLQJWKDWWKHSHWLWLRQHU·VDIÀOLDWLRQZLWKDO4DHGD´ZDVVXIÀFLHQWO\
vitiated” at the time of capture that he was not detainable under the AUMF); Basardh, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (stating that
“the AUMF does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent those individuals
from rejoining the battle . . . .”). Contra Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (noting that “Al-Bihani makes plain that the United States’
authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on whether an individual would pose a threat to the United
States or its allies if released but rather upon the continuation of hostilities”).
135 See infra notes 136-37.
136 See 626 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (noting the possibility that a “prior relationship between a detainee and al Qaeda (or the
7DOLEDQ FDQEHVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGE\WKHSDVVDJHRI WLPHLQWHUYHQLQJHYHQWVRUERWKVXFKWKDWWKHGHWDLQHHFRXOGQR
longer be considered to be ‘part of ’ either organization at the time of his capture”).
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should be vitiated.137 As described below, a standard synthesizing these two principles is predicated
upon sound legal arguments.
C. Legal Foundation of New Approach
State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh has articulated the administration’s assertion of
detention authority as being founded on the AUMF, “as informed by the principles of the laws of
war.”138 This echoes the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit Courts’ treatment of the issue, as well as that
of the Supreme Court in Hamdi. However, not only do the laws of war and the AUMF not support
the current standard, they instead expressly support the type of new approach outlined above.139
Put simply, both the AUMF and laws of war justify only preventative detention.140 If the government
detains an individual who does not pose a threat to the United States, the detention is not preventaWLYHDQGWKHUHIRUHQRWVWDWXWRULO\MXVWLÀHG
1. AUMF
The AUMF is the exclusive source of statutory authority cited by the current administration to
detain potential terrorists.141 While the statute’s purpose certainly had a retaliatory component,142
scholars generally conclude that its fundamental purpose today is to prevent future terrorist attacks.143 This purpose is evident in the text144 and was expressly verbalized by President Bush when
he signed it into law.145 Even Judge Robertson, an outspoken proponent of the current standard,
acknowledges that the AUMF’s “self-stated” purpose is to prevent future terrorist attacks.146 The
AUMF “requires some nexus between the force (i.e. detention) and its purpose (i.e. preventing indi137 See Basardh, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (holding that the AUMF compels the court to consider whether the detainee
presently poses a threat to the United States).
138 Crook, supra note 25, at 275.
139 See infra Parts III.C.1–2.
140 See id.
141 See Baker, supra note 21 (“The Obama administration . . . will instead rely only [the AUMF] to continue to detain
SHRSOHLQGHÀQLWHO\DQGZLWKRXWFKDUJHµ 
142 See AUMF (authorizing the United States to “exercise its right to self-defense” and “use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons . . . [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001”).
143 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 378 (citing AUMF) (noting that the AUMF’s purpose is to “prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States” and that “this short passage subsequently became the legal basis
. . . to detain members of al-Qaeda”); Resnick, supra note 123, at 604 (stating that the AUMF authorizes “preventative
detention”).
144 See AUMF (noting that the bill’s purpose is to “prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States”).
145 See3UHVV5HOHDVH:KLWH+RXVH2IÀFHRI WKH3UHVV6HFUHWDU\3UHVLGHQW6LJQV$XWKRUL]DWLRQIRU8VHRI 
Military Force Bill (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
print/20010918-10.html (stating that the bill recognizes “the authority of the President under the Constitution to . . .
prevent acts of terrorism against the United States”).
146 Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C 2009).
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viduals from rejoining the enemy to commit future hostile acts).”147
,WIROORZVWKDWLI WKHGHWDLQHHGRHVQRWSRVHDWKUHDWWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVRUPRUHVSHFLÀFDOO\LI 
he will not rejoin the terrorist group to which he previously had ties, then the AUMF does not justify his detention. This was the general pattern of reasoning applied by Judge Huvelle in Basardh.148
&ULWLFDOWRKHUUHDVRQLQJZDVKHUÀQGLQJWKDWDFFRUGLQJWRWKH$80)WKHOLNHOLKRRGRI DQLQGLYLGual rejoining the enemy was relevant to the legality of further detention.149 Finding that extenuating
circumstances in Basardh’s case made it impossible for him to rejoin al Qaeda, Judge Huvelle held
WKDWYLWLDWLRQZDVMXVWLÀHG150 Judge Leon in Al Ginco IROORZHGDVLPLODUURXWHÀQGLQJWKDWFLUFXPstances in between Al Ginco’s terrorist ties and the time of his detention showed that he was not a
threat at the time of his capture and therefore did not currently pose a threat. Thus, the AUMF did
not authorize his detention.151
2. Laws of War
*LYHQWKDWWKHODZVRI ZDU´LQIRUPµWKH$80)·VMXVWLÀFDWLRQRI 86GHWHQWLRQDXWKRULW\152
it is important to analyze the extent to which they support the current standard. The laws of war
play such a critical and prominent role in this debate because of Hamdi, which has been commonly
understood to interpret the laws of war and the AUMF as authorizing the United States to detain
SULVRQHUV´IRUWKHGXUDWLRQRI WKHUHOHYDQWFRQÁLFWµ153 Yet, this ruling was not as clear-cut as the
supporters of the current vitiation standard want it to be. The Court in fact attached a critical qualiÀHUQRWLQJWKDWLI WKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI DSDUWLFXODUFRQÁLFWDUHPDUNHGO\GLIIHUHQWIURP
WKRVHFRQÁLFWVXSRQZKLFKWKHODZVRI ZDUZHUHIRUPXODWHGDSSOLFDWLRQRI WKHODZVRI ZDUPD\EH
unwarranted.154
Hamdi·VTXDOLÀFDWLRQDQG+DUROG.RK·VVWDWHPHQWSUHVHQWWKUHHNH\TXHVWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKH
laws of war. First, how binding are the laws of war on our detention authority? Second, if the laws
RI ZDUDUHFRQWUROOLQJLQDQ\ZD\GRWKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI WKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFWPDQGDWH
147 Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009).
148 See id. at 35 (holding that the detainee must be released because “the undisputed facts establish that Basardh’s
[redacted] is known to the world, and thus, any ties with the enemy have been severed, and any realistic risk that he could
rejoin the enemy has been foreclosed”).
149 Id.
150 See id. (noting that “any realistic risk that he could rejoin the enemy has been foreclosed”).
151 See Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2009) (asserting that “the conclusion is inescapable that his
SUHH[LVWLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVXFKDVLWZDVZDVVXIÀFLHQWO\YLWLDWHGWKDWKHZDVQRORQJHU¶SDUWRI ·DO4DHGD RUWKH7DOLEDQ 
at the time he was taken into custody . . . [a]ccordingly, the Government has failed to establish . . . that [the detainee]
was lawfully detainable as an enemy combatant under the AUMF at the time he was taken into custody [and must be
released]”).
152 Crook, supra note 25, at 275.
153 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
154 Id.; see Azmy, supra note 3, at 510–11 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521) (noting that HamdiTXDOLÀHGWKDWLI ´¶WKH
SUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI DJLYHQFRQÁLFW·UHYHDOWKHPVHOYHVWREHXQOLNHWKRVHZKLFKLQIRUPHGWKHFUHDWLRQRI WKHODZV
of war, then this prior understanding may ‘unravel’. . .”).
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their application, as stipulated by Hamdi?155 Third, assuming that the laws of war are applicable and
inform the contours of our detention authority, what do they authorize?
a. How binding are the laws of war?
The laws of war are not comprehensively binding on the United States in the arena of detention law, but the Obama administration acknowledges that they inform the scope of U.S. detention
authority.156 The limit of their control over U.S. detention authority is evident in Al-Bihani. While
Judge Brown stated that “international laws of war are helpful to courts when identifying the general
set of war powers to which the AUMF speaks,” she then noted that “their lack of controlling legal
IRUFHDQGÀUPGHÀQLWLRQUHQGHUWKHLUXVHERWKLQDSSRVLWHDQGLQDGYLVDEOHZKHQFRXUWVVHHNWRGHtermine the limits of the President’s war powers.”157 As mentioned in section II.B., however, Judge
Brown later went on to cite the laws of war as broadly shaping the limits of presidential war powers, reasoning that the Geneva Conventions allow the President to detain terrorist suspects for the
GXUDWLRQRI WKHFRQÁLFW158 While the laws of war then inform the extent of U.S. detention authority
under the AUMF, their judicial interpretation and application indicate how their precise impact is still
unsettled.159

155 542 U.S. at 521.
156 See Bradley, supra note 133, at 2088–89 (noting how the laws of war can “both give content to the powers that
the AUMF confers on the President and provide boundaries on the scope of Congress’s authorization”); Crook, supra
QRWHDW QRWLQJWKDW´ERWKLQRXULQWHUQDOGLVFXVVLRQVDERXWVSHFLÀF*XDQWDQDPRGHWDLQHHVDQGEHIRUHWKH
courts in habeas cases, we have interpreted the scope of detention authority authorized by Congress in the AUMF as
informed by the laws of war”); Mortlock, supra note 27, at 382 (explaining that, “though not independently binding on
the President, the [laws of war] help inform where the limitations on detention should lie under the AUMF”). Some
scholars additionally argue that given the transnational nature of international terrorism, international law should play
more of a controlling role in informing our detention authority. See Resnick, supra note 123, at 579 (stating that “given
the transnational nature of the threats themselves . . . this arena of law would seem to invite transnational judicial
exchanges . . . [n]ot only do many countries grapple with terror, many (like the United States) have responded by
detaining individuals preventatively”).
157 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010). As mentioned above, the extent of the law of war’s
controlling force is still subject to debate given the D.C. Circuit’s August 30, 2010 denial to rehear Al-Bihani en banc. See
supra note 64.
158 See Al-Bihani. 590 F.3d at 874 (arguing that “the Geneva Conventions require release and repatriation only at the
‘cessation of active hostilities’. . . ”).
159 See supra note 64 (describing recent D.C. Circuit panel’s denial of a rehearing of Al-Bihani and noting that while
seven Judges joined in the denial, two concurred to disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the language in question
was controlling (and not dicta)).
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E'RWKH´SUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVµRI WKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFWZDUUDQWODZRI ZDUDSSOLFDELOLW\"
Assuming that the laws of war inform the extent of our detention authority under the AUMF,
Hamdi·VTXDOLÀFDWLRQ160 opens the door to the separate argument that the practical circumstances161
of the OCO preclude the comprehensive application of the laws of war. Indeed, by qualifying its
holding in this manner, HamdiLPSOLFLWO\DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKH´FHVVDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWµPRGHORI 
GHWHQWLRQPD\QRWEHDSSURSULDWHIRURUDSSOLFDEOHWRWKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFW162
The OCO is certainly different from the wars on which the framers of the international laws of
war relied when the laws were drafted, casting into doubt their seamless application in the current
FRQÁLFW163:DUVRI WKDWHUDZHUHSULPDULO\WUDGLWLRQDODUPHGFRQÁLFWVDPRQJVWDWHVDQGGLGQRWSLW
DVXSHUSRZHUDJDLQVWD´GLIIXVHGLIÀFXOWWRLGHQWLI\WHUURULVWHQHP\µ164 In the OCO, the “enemy
LQWHUPLQJOHVZLWKFLYLOLDQVµDQG´WKHEDWWOHÀHOGODFNVDSUHFLVHJHRJUDSKLFORFDWLRQµ165 It is also difÀFXOW´WRFRQFHSWXDOL]HWKHHQGRI WKHFRQÁLFWµZKLFK´UDLVHVTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RI 
traditional powers to detain and try the enemy.”1661XPHURXVFULWLFVKDYHDOVRSRLQWHGVSHFLÀFDOO\
WRWKHSUREOHPVRI DSSO\LQJWKH´FHVVDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWµGXUDWLRQDOVWDQGDUGWRWKH2&2167 Because
of these practical circumstances, Hamdi arguably supports the non-application of the cessation of
FRQÁLFWPRGHOWRWKH2&2
c. What do the laws of war authorize?
Yet, assuming that the laws of war doDSSO\WRWKHFXUUHQWFRQÁLFWDQGLQIRUP86GHWHQWLRQ
160 See86DW QRWLQJWKDW´LI WKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI DJLYHQFRQÁLFWDUHHQWLUHO\XQOLNHWKRVHRI WKH
FRQÁLFWVWKDWKDYHLQIRUPHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI WKHODZRI ZDUWKHQWKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJPD\XQUDYHO Azmy, supra
note 3, at 510–11 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521) (noting that HamdiTXDOLÀHGWKDWLI ´¶WKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI 
DJLYHQFRQÁLFW·UHYHDOWKHPVHOYHVWREHXQOLNHWKRVHZKLFKLQIRUPHGWKHFUHDWLRQRI WKHODZVRI ZDUWKHQWKLVSULRU
understanding may ‘unravel’ . . .”).
161 542 U.S. at 521.
162 See id. QRWLQJWKDW´>L@I WKHSUDFWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI DJLYHQFRQÁLFWDUHHQWLUHO\XQOLNHWKRVHRI WKHFRQÁLFWV
that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel”).
163 See Yin, supra note 119, at 210–11 (explaining that “simply because military force might be reasonably directed
DJDLQVWQRQVWDWHDFWRUVXQGHUGRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLWGRHVQRWIROORZWKDWWKHODZRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWFDQEH
transferred seamlessly into the new context”).
164 Crook, supra note 25, at 275 (“Construing what is ‘necessary and appropriate’ under the AUMF requires some
‘translation,’ or analogizing principles from the laws of war governing traditional internationalFRQÁLFWVµ see Yin, supra
QRWHDW H[SODLQLQJWKDW´WKHODZRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWRQWKHRWKHUKDQGGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRKDYHDQWLFLSDWHGWKH
use of force against nonstate actors”).
165 Bradley, supra note 133, at 2048–49.
166 See id.
167 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 396 (explaining that, due to the indeterminate length of the OCO, “in the terrorism
FRQWH[WWKLV>ODZRI ZDUFHVVDWLRQRI FRQÁLFWGXUDWLRQDO@VWDQGDUGSURGXFHVDQH[WUHPHUHVXOWµ <LQsupra note 119, at
189 (stressing that ´DZDU RUPLOLWDU\FRQÁLFW ZLWKWKHREMHFWLYHRI GHIHDWLQJ¶WHUURULVP·LVDVPDQ\RWKHUKDYHQRWHG
of potentially never-ending duration”); id. at 205–06 (arguing that “when military force is applied against nonstate actors
VXFKDVDO4DHGDWKHFRQWLQXLQJH[LVWHQFHRI VXFKDQHQWLW\>IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRI FHVVDWLRQRI FRQÁLFW@LVPXFKOHVVFOHDU
DVLVWKHDELOLW\RI VXFKHQWLW\WRQHJRWLDWHDQHQGWRWKHFRQÁLFWµ .
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authority therein, what do they actually authorize in the context of vitiation? In other words, under
the international laws of war, how long can the United States detain potential terrorists detained
during the OCO?
While the laws of war have been repeatedly cited to authorize detention for the duration of
WKHFRQÁLFWUHJDUGOHVVRI WKHWKUHDWSRVHGE\WKHLQGLYLGXDOWKHLUOHJLVODWLYHLQWHQWKDVDOWHUQDWLYHO\
been interpreted to authorize only preventative detention.168 The most cited portion of the laws of
war in the context of detention and vitiation is Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention, which
states that prisoners “shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities.”169+RZHYHULQVWHDGRI LQWHQGLQJWRSURYLGHZDUULQJSDUWLHVZLWKWKHDELOLW\WRLQGHÀnitely detain prisoners regardless of their respective threat levels, some scholars believe that “the
SXUSRVHRI >$UWLFOH@LVWRSUHYHQWHQHP\FRPEDWDQWVIURPUHWXUQLQJWRÀJKWµ 170 By detaining
SULVRQHUVRI ZDUIRUWKHHQWLUHW\RI DFRQÁLFWDFRXQWU\SUHYHQWVWKHSULVRQHUVWKDWLWKROGVIURP
UHWXUQLQJWRWKHÀJKW171 Academics have interpreted HamdiDVFRQÀUPLQJWKLVFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ172
7KHUHIRUHLI WKHGHWHQWLRQGRHVQRWSURKLELWVRPHRQHIURPUHWXUQLQJWRWKHÀHOGRI EDWWOHWKHQ
the laws of war do not authorize detention and the detainee must be released.173 If a former memEHURI DO4DHGDUHQRXQFHVKLVSUHYLRXVWHUURULVWWLHVDQGGHFLGHVWKDWKHQRORQJHUZDQWVWRÀJKW
against the United States, he is no longer dangerous and his detention status should be vitiated under
the laws of war.174 Such would be consistent with the spirit of the laws of war, which recognize
the possibility that a detainee, who was once dangerous, may become harmless prior to cessation of
hostilities.175

168 See Yin, supraQRWHDW QRWLQJWKDW´LQWKHFDVHRI WKHODZRI DUPHGFRQÁLFWZKLFKLVJRYHUQHGODUJHO\E\
the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the harm justifying intervention includes
potential of future harm; detention of enemy soldiers is based purely on preventative incapacitation grounds”); id. at 169
(noting that the law of war “allows detention of enemy prisoners of war solely to prevent them from engaging in further
FRQÁLFWDJDLQVWWKHGHWDLQLQJVWDWHµ 
169 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135.
170 Bradley, supra note 133, at 2123.
171 Yin, supra note 119, at 166; see Mortlock, supra note 27, at 382 (“Detention is intended to prevent enemy
FRPEDWDQWVIURPUHWXUQLQJWRWKHEDWWOHÀHOGµ 
172 See Azmy, supraQRWHDW QRWLQJWKDWLQGHÀQLQJ86GHWHQWLRQDXWKRULW\FRXUWVKDYHRIWHQFKDUDFWHUL]HG
“members of al Qaeda and the Taliban [as] tantamount to uniformed members of the ‘armed forces’ who the
Government can target under the Geneva Conventions and, according to Hamdi, GHWDLQWRSUHYHQWUHWXUQWRWKHEDWWOHÀHOG”)
(emphasis added).
173 See Yin, supra note 119, at 169 (noting that “the underlying rationale of [the Geneva Convention] is that enemy
prisoners of war who no longer pose any threat to the detaining State . . . should be repatriated”).
174 See id. at 206.
175 See Mortlock, supra note 27, at 401 (“Detainees who sincerely renounce their loyalty to al Qaeda and its goals no
ORQJHUSUHVHQWDWKUHDWWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV>D@FFRUGLQJO\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVQRORQJHUKDVWKHMXVWLÀFDWLRQLWRQFH
did to detain them.”).
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D. Who Should Set The Standard?
Having articulated a new standard to be applied in the context of detention vitiation, a critical
question remains: who should set this new standard? Scholars seem divided on this issue.176 Many
argue that the post-Boumediene common law process has shown itself to be woefully unsuccessful
LQHVWDEOLVKLQJFOHDUMXVWLÀDEOHOHJDOVWDQGDUGVWREHDSSOLHGLQGHWHQWLRQFDVHV177 Others argue that
the federal court system is perfectly capable of establishing such proper guidelines.178 This Article
advocates the former position.
Those who contend that the federal court system should continue to set substantive and procedural standards in Guantanamo detention cases rely on three distinct arguments.1797KHÀUVWLV
straightforward: Hamdi and Boumediene establish the Supreme Court’s clear preference for the federal
courts to play this role.180 One scholar, Judith Resnick, goes so far as to say that the Supreme Court
cases provide a “constitutional mandate” for the Judiciary’s continued role in the incremental, common law creation of post-Boumediene procedural standards.181 Second, from a separation of powers
standpoint, the federal courts can also, in this role, “meaningfully constrict the Executive’s expansive
claims of detention authority.”182
Third, scholars argue that the federal courts are well equipped to handle the challenge, and point
to the progress that has already been made.1832QWKHÀUVWSRLQWZKLOHWKH*XDQWDQDPRFDVHVUDLVH
“challenging normative, political, and practical considerations,”184 it is argued that such challenges are
within the “expertise and competence” of the district courts.185 The issues raised by Guantanamo
cases are far from “exotic”186 and are instead “continuous with judicial responses to the central challenges, faced daily, by governments trying to maintain peace and security and, hence, incapacitating
VRPHLQGLYLGXDOVIHDUHGOLNHO\WRLQÁLFWJUDYHKDUPWRWKHVRFLDORUGHUµ187 In addition, many cite the
176 See Resnick, supra note 123, at 586 (noting that “[t]he 9/11 case law has prompted diverse assessments, with
arguments that the judiciary has done too much, or too little, or left unanswered important questions about the
permissible scope of executive detention and surveillance powers”).
177 See infra notes 191-197.
178 See infra notes 180-189.
179 See id.
180 See Azmy, supra note 3, at 537 (describing BoumedieneDVD´GHFUHHWKDWWKHFRXUWVZLOOKDYHDVLJQLÀFDQWUROHLQ
managing executive detention operations to ensure they comply with the most elementary constraints of law”); id. at 450
(celebrating Boumediene’s “historic judgment” that “defend[s] the Court’s asserted role as necessary and correct”).
181 Resnick, supra note 123, at 626; see id. at 625 (interpreting Hamdi as ´DZLVHSODFHKROGHUÀUPO\LQVLVWHQWRQDUROH
for the courts” in Guantanamo cases).
182 Azmy, supra note 3, at 499.
183 See infra notes 184-189.
184 Azmy, supra note 3, at 537.
185 Id.; see also Pogge, supra note 4, at 1094–95 (noting that judges are “skilled in procedural matters” and that “their
experience in this area seems to make them the natural choice to be the creators of the habeas procedures”).
186 Resnick, supra note 123, at 584; see also id. at 634 (noting that the “key elements that form the predicate for 9/11
detention,” including “deciding who to detain, and dealing over long periods of time with people determined to be
HJUHJLRXVO\GDQJHURXVHYHQDVWKH\WRRDUHLQQHHGRI VDIHW\RUGLVFLSOLQHZKLOHFRQÀQHGµDUH´QRWVXLJHQHULVWR
but are variations on the core problems of criminal law”).
187 Id. at 584.
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progress made so far188 as “proving [that the courts are] amply equipped to resolve these cases and
are competent to do so without interfering with core areas of military discretion.”189
However, the arguments for a legislatively mandated standard are more compelling than the
arguments articulated above.190 While the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit Courts have certainly made
some degree of progress, in that they have issued rulings in a number of Guantanamo cases, those
rulings have presented what some describe as a “contradictory and incoherent body of law.”191 As
previously explained, the results at the District Court level, especially on the question of vitiation,
vary from judge to judge.192 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit Court has recently adopted a standard
that arguably lacks statutory authority.193 Some argue that Congress is better suited to act in the area
of national security,194 and it has furthermore shown the ability to expeditiously and appropriately
intervene in such matters.195 In sum, the circumstances illustrate “strong evidence of the need for
legislative rules,”196 and a congressional standard similar to that proposed by this Article would instill
RYHUDUFKLQJFODULW\ZKLOHDOORZLQJWKHFRXUWVWRDSSO\FDVHVSHFLÀFIDFWVWRUHDFKLQGLYLGXDOUXOLQJV197
IV. CONCLUSION
The current standard for vitiation, as held and applied by the D.C. Circuit Court in Al-Bihani and
Awad, provides that vitiation is impossible if the criteria for detention have ever been met and the
SHUWLQHQWFRQÁLFWLVRQJRLQJ198 In other words, as articulated by Judge Hogan, even if the detainee
188 See id. at 626 (emphasizing that the post-Boumediene D.C. District Court opinions “have shaped a common law of
habeas corpus rights and remedies as, in dozens of rulings, district and appellate judges mined the parameters of lawful
FRQÀQHPHQWIRUDOOHJHGHQHP\FRPEDWDQWVµ 
189 Azmy, supra note 3, at 514–15.
190 See Pogge, supra note 4, at 1096 (noting that ´>W@KHVHSRWHQWLDOEHQHÀWV>RI DMXGLFLDOO\FUHDWHGVWDQGDUG@ZKHQ
weighed against [the alternative of a legislative standard], do not ultimately justify a judicially dominated procedureshaping system”).
191 Jack Goldsmith and Benjamin Wittes, No Place to Write Detention Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2009, at A19.
192 See Benjamin Wittes, Editorial, Obama’s Dick Cheney Moment, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2009, at A19 (noting that “the
judges who have heard habeas cases have disagreed about a great many central issues”).
193 See supra Part III.C.
194 See Benjamin Wittes, Obama Retreats on Creating a Better System for Detaining Suspected Terrorists, WASH. POST, Sept. 29,
2009, available at,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/28/AR2009092802492.html (questioning whether
it is “really better to hand this complex policy problem over to the whim of [unelected judges] than to ask the legislature
to decide when America is going to detain alleged terrorists, under what rules and with what rights”).
195 See Wittes, supra note 19, at 9 (noting that in the aftermath of Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Congress “soon
UHVSRQGHGZLWKWKH'HWDLQHH7UHDWPHQW$FW '7$ RI ZKLFKDWÀUVWEOXVKDSSHDUHGWRHOLPLQDWH>WKH@VWDWXWRU\
habeas jurisdiction [articulated in Rasul] in favor of a potentially more limited form of judicial review committed
exclusively to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals”).
196 Id. at 7.
197 See Pogge, supra note 4, at 1096-97 (arguing that a congressional standard would “create a more systematically
balanced process” and ´LQVWLOOXQLIRUPLW\ZKLOHVWLOODOORZLQJMXGJHVÁH[LELOLW\LQDGMXGLFDWLQJVSHFLÀFSHWLWLRQHUV·
claims”).
198 See supra Part II.C.

